The Return of Class Politics: What America’s Populist Surge Really Means
“The only minority destroying America is the billionaires. The biggest divide in our politics isn’t left vs. right—it’s top vs. bottom.” declares rising Texas congressman James Talarico. The crowd bursts into applause. These words resonate because they express a feeling within the working class that has been boiling for years: class anger.
It’s the sentiment of millions who have lived through decades of declining economic conditions and rising costs of living, while a political system consistently delivers for the rich and demands sacrifice from workers.It is an anger at the ever-more-evident injustice: the economy works for the few, not the many. Workers know they’re being left behind.
Unrest within the working class, and a general anger at their conditions, is manifesting in the re-emergence of populism. But because this anger has not yet fully crystallized into class politics, it reappears first in the language of populism: the virtuous “people” against a corrupt “elite.” Populism, however contradictory, is the first expression of workers moving again toward class politics.
Populism’s Resurgence
Populism’s resurgence in America can be traced back to the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The crash destroyed jobs and ruined workers’ lives, while the government bailed out the rich. This was when Occupy Wall Street surged, the idea of the 99% versus the 1% gained mass popularity. Poor conditions led to working class anger towards the system that left them behind.
In the 2010s, as inequality deepened despite the so-called “recovery,” this working-class discontent found electoral expression. Bernie Sanders and his brand of “democratic socialism” inspired millions who felt forgotten.
Donald Trump, from the opposite side, also thrived on populism and rallied against the “establishment.” While left-populists channeled class anger into reform campaigns, Trump redirected it against minorities, particularly immigrants. He was very popular amongst the white working class. Though opposed to one another, both Sanders and Trump drew from the same source: working-class discontent with a dysfunctional economic system. Indeed, up to 12 percent of Bernie Sanders democratic nomination voters cast their ballot for Trump in the general election.
As inequality and economic conditions worsen, populism has continued its rise. Trump won in 2024 over Kamala Harris by intensifying his “right-populist” rhetoric of directing working-class anger towards immigrants. Meanwhile, Harris’s position merely represented the establishment status quo; voters unsurprisingly rejected it. In the process, AOC’s congressional district – where she retains large popularity – swung significantly towards Trump. Exemplifying the populist phenomena, AOC asked her voters why many of her supporters voted for trump, and responses included: “Trump and you care for the working class.”, “You are focused on the real issues people care about. Similar to Trump populism in some ways,” and: “You signaled change. Trump signified change. I’ve said lately, Trump sounds more like you.”
The latest new example came in June 2025: when self described “democratic socialist” Zohran Mamdani defeated the establishment candidate Andrew Cuomo in the democratic primary. Mamdani ran a left-populist campaign that appealed to the interests of the working class: taxing the rich, increasing social spending, and expanding public housing, among other things.
All of this goes to show that resentment of the elite has become the most powerful force in U.S. politics.
Why Now?
The populist resurgence is rooted in the material decline of working-class life. In 1970, a single income could, in many places, support a family; today, even two incomes often fail to cover the key necessities (rent, childcare, and healthcare). For decades, working-class wages have either stagnated or declined, flatlined while prices have almost universally increased. Inequality has reached levels unseen since the Gilded Age, with the top 10% owning 70% of America’s wealth, while the bottom 50 percent own a meager 2.8%. Even if workers don’t see these statistics, they recognize the disparity in their everyday life. They know they’re getting ripped off. And instead of politicians fighting for the worker’s interests, they see politicians who con, lie, and sleaze while the rich get richer by the day. A large majority of Americans, 69%, think the American dream does not hold true or never did.
As written in “Capital”, “Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, torment, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole.” Such massive inequality leads to “misery and torment,” which leads to class anger: against the “capitalist” class that constantly gets richer. Anger that the working class always seems to be sidelined, poorer and more destitute. These economic conditions are the basis on which populism is rising.
A Return to the Past
This new rise of class anger and populism is not so much a new era as it is a return to the past.
The “class collaborative” politics that defined the entire era from about 1945 was an anomaly. From 1945 until the mid 1970’s many (mostly white) workers enjoyed high standards of living born out of a post-war boom, significant social spending through the New Deal, and the USA standing as the sole superpower and center of the global economy. This temporary prosperity largely suppressed class conflict and any of its political expressions. Since 1976, the postwar idea of “class collaborative politics,” has slowly declined, but only since the 2010s has it truly begun to crumble and return to the “norm.”
Before the unprecedented postwar period, populism and class-based politics were extremely prevalent. In the Gilded Age, inequality was at massive levels, working conditions were brutal, and conflict reached extreme heights (with legitimate military conflicts starting from labor wars). The quintessential populist party: the People’s Party had significant popularity and rallied against elites, in favor of the common man and farmers’ interests. But discontent went further.
Class anger turned into class politics. It was distinguished from populism by its sharper formulation: not just “people” versus “elite”, but the working class, versus the capitalist class. The Socialist Party of America gained mass followings, with leaders like Eugene Debs. The Communist Party of America, formed out of significant working-class unrest, became strong enough to trigger the nation’s first “red scare.”
As economic conditions mirror those of the past, and as the resurgence of populism shows that postwar political consensus is truly over, it is clear: our future is reflected in the past – in the movements of those like Eugene Debs.
The Future?
Populism rises in America today. But the rise of populism cannot last forever, but will rather lead to class politics.
Populism is inherently unstable: it is based on the idea of a virtuous “people” against an “elite.” But who counts as the people? Who counts as the elite? This inherent ambiguity is what allows figures as opposed as Trump and Mamdani to be classified as populists. And this vagueness means the energy of the working class is misdirected from solving the root causes of their economic discontent, into failure.
The right-wing populism of Trump cannot ever fix declining living standards. It misdirects discontent towards minorities, like immigrants or transgender people: this can only ever trick the working class – it can never solve its problems. Right-populism has done nothing but side with the wealthy at every turn: tax breaks for the rich, pushing anti-union measures, cutting social spending. They exacerbate the conditions that make them popular, not solve them. We already see discontent at the populists’ lies, as Trump’s populist presidency is already very unpopular.
Left-wing, reformist populism, comes closer to addressing the root causes, but it, too, encounters failure. Bernie Sanders, despite all of his popularity, was shunned by the DNC in favor of the establishment candidate Hillary Clinton. Mamdani was criticized by much of the Democratic establishment, with house minority leader Hakeem Jeffries calling Mamdani “bad for the Democratic Party nationwide,” despite his large margin of victory over Cuomo and likely shoo-in election to NYC mayor. The DNC isn’t getting any warmer to the Mamdanis, their current 2028 frontrunner is “centrist” Gavin Newsom. Any success the left-wing populists may receive is likely to be narrowed and nullified by the limits of the Democratic Party. And the occasional, fragile reform won’t be enough to fix the massive structural problems the working class is experiencing.
In the case of either populism, disillusionment is the inevitable result.
But as economic conditions worsen, class anger will only intensify. When populism fails to deliver, the working class will be forced into sharper forms of political expression. As in the Gilded Age, their class anger will be hardened into more radical movements and organizations that openly frame the conflict as one between labor and capital. These class politics, similar to the Gilded age, will likely adopt methods outside of the electoral sphere – such as mass strikes and protests – in an attempt to achieve political aims.
Talarico’s “Top vs Bottom” names the mood of the present, yet when even populist politicians like him are unable to fulfill the masses’ wishes, the politics of the future will be born: class politics.