Panic at the Parliament! – Snap Elections and the Political Crisis in Bulgaria
The political atmosphere
Eastern European countries are hardly strangers to instability. While the region has been coup d’etat-free since the 1940s, it’s facing more modern types of political instability instead. After the fall of communism in Poland, a cascade of governmental changes were triggered across Eastern Europe, resembling a much needed return to democracy. However, this came at the cost of regional economies and corruption within governments. Hyperinflation became a temporary norm in markets and manipulation within the government was complicitly seen as a “lesser evil” in the face of previous communism. These trends did not die out with the turn of the 21st century, but rather, evolved and modernized.
This has especially been a problem in Bulgaria, a nation that has been subject to extreme political and economic turbulence in the past few decades. The country has survived hyperinflation rates in the triple digits, collusion between its government and the mafia, countless major corruption scandals, and until 1990, the country was not even an official democracy. From a psychological standpoint, Bulgarians have even become more pessimistic when discussing the past two decades of development. The country’s long-winded troubles are partially owed to its struggles with communism during the ‘90s, while other aspects stem from its difficulty in integrating into international alliances including the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It’s easy to claim that Bulgaria has been set up for failure ever since it left the Balkans’ communist hivemind and geared itself towards navigating the world on its own. The truth, however, is that the country would be in a significantly more stable place had these crises not snowballed.
Without a reliable political foundation, the country is far from stability. Every five years, Bulgarians will elect a president and every four years, a parliament (known in Bulgaria as their National Assembly) forms based on the parties that win the majority and minority proportions. However, this system was not implemented effectively until the most recent election as Bulgaria had been relying on temporary caretaker governments as a result of party incohernece. Despite President Rumen Radev’s best efforts, nationwide anti-graft protests beginning in 2020 gave a glimpse into how little Bulgarians trusted their leaders.
Data from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Bulgarian National Bank also suggests that economic growth is actively slowing for Bulgaria and its trading partners. An ongoing political upheaval within the parliament has, and will continue to contribute to these trends. After President Radev made the decision to dissolve the parliament and hold snap elections in April, he gave Bulgarians an opportunity to decide what their next few years as a country would look like. With an already bleak economic and political landscape, however, citizens are still doubtful. This sense of hopelessness has led an entire nation to ask itself: why exactly is the government in shambles and what comes next for Bulgaria?
What’s on the ballot
Voting in April came with countless hot-button issues on the ballot. The anti-corruption protests that shook the country from 2020 to 2021, the slowing economic growth, and political controversies were all issues that voters were considering. However, the most pressing issue for citizens this election was fraud. Known as the most corrupt country in the EU, Bulgaria is well worthy of public outrage when it comes to fraud. This is especially true now, as a report published by the Center for the Study of Democracy revealed that Bulgarian corruption is at its highest point in two decades. In the context of April’s snap elections, voters sought to find a solution: a party that would defend against the clutches of fraud by the elite. With such an opportunity, parties like “Change Continues” maintained strong bases of support with promises that they would eliminate corruption from all forms of governance. Regardless, various scandals linked to “Change Continues” have made Bulgarians skeptical of defending them at the polls.
Additionally, following the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe as a whole has been forced to sharpen its foreign policy strategy, making external affairs yet another key voting issue. Polls have shown that up to 70% of Bulgarians are against sending more aid to Ukraine with fears that doing so could unfavorably rope them into a war that they can not afford to participate in. Thankfully, for President Radev’s mainly pro-Russia administration, this is in line with the values of Bulgaria’s executive branch. In April, it came time to see if the same would apply to the parliament. The “Revival” party and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)have so far been able to take advantage of the public’s pro-Russia views. In contrast, parties known for their strong pro-Ukraine motifs have struggled. “Change Continues” and their campaign promise to arm and politically support Ukraine has been losing steam among their voter base.
At the end of the day, it is domestic concerns, like corruption and the state of the economy, that are the main motivators on ballots. Voters are searching for continued investment in infrastructure (especially in the construction of highways,) improved safety nets after retirement, and more extensive, accessible public services. Although these issues are seriously neglected in comparison to their importance, there are still parties that have expressed a level of solidarity addressing them.Multiple parties have endorsed a plan to build a new highway in the country’s southern regions and the prospects for financing it are optimistic.
What happened
Prior to the most recent election, the parliament was jointly being ruled by two blocs: the GERB and SDS parties on one bloc and PP-DB (“We Continue the Change” and “Democratic Bulgaria”) on the other. Together, they oversaw the nation’s coalition (temporary) government while each defending their own set of conditions that had to be met for cooperation to continue. As part of this deal, it was established that two ministers, Nikolai Denkov of PP-DB and Maria Gabriel of GERB-SDS, would rotate being prime minister, each ruling for 9 months before resigning and letting the other take their place. This rotation strategy was poised for failure as polls revealed Bulgarians’ honest reactions: roughly 60% disapproved of this tactic. Soon, Bulgarians’ worst fears were coming true after Denkov’s resignation in March. The PP-DB bloc refused to have Gabriel take on the role of prime minister, urging the GERB-SDS bloc to find another candidate. With this, Gabriel quit her job as Minister of Foreign Affairs and announced that she was no longer willing to serve as Deputy Prime Minister. Thus, the sole deal which was keeping the coalition together fell apart in a matter of weeks. This incident was the first of many cracks in the temporary government’s political foundation, and it only paved the way for further instability.
By the end of February, President Radev had recognized that a stable coalition would be impossible to uphold to the end of the current term. Snap elections were to be held immediately so that a new parliament could be established, and parties could deliberate over their counterproductive divisiveness. All parties with more than 4% of the vote can secure a place in the parliament and the percentage of the vote received will proportionally determine how many representatives a party can send. Essentially, parliamentary elections are a popularity contest and the more support a party amasses, the more control it has in the newly-founded parliament.
Main parties
In any election, it’s not uncommon to get parties confused. Some will preach almost identical campaign promises while others will endorse each other in order to keep their ideologies relevant and popular. To fully debrief the results of April’s election, it’s crucial to first pick apart what leads Bulgarians to choose one party’s candidate over the other; otherwise, it’s easy to overgeneralize campaigns and ignore what specifically is setting candidates apart.
One of the most influential groups in the last parliament, “We Continue the Change”, was created by Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev with the main intention of taking on corruption in the Bulgarian government. This came in the context of months-long anti-fraud protests during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, allowing Petkov and Vasilev to ride a wave of public frustration to increase support for their political campaign. As seen in prior coalitions, “We Continue the Change” has been known to steer away from cooperation with other parties. With one exception in 2023, when they officially merged with the long-existing “Democratic Bulgaria” party. Their political isolation can be explained by the dominance of polls they held. Now, after suffering through multiple internal scandals and dropping rapidly in popularity, they likely won’t be able to sidestep concession-making. The party’s refusal to accept Maria Gabriel as prime minister in March, even despite prior agreements, is the first sign that they might not be able to continue pushing their own agenda without cooperating with others.
Although “Change Continues” and GERB have both been tainted by heaps of scandals, only GERB has managed to consistently emerge unscathed. Surprisingly, GERB has endured accusations of far more extensive wrongdoing compared to any other party, even being one of a few alleged to have links to the mafia. The reason behind GERB’s endurance lies in their decades of political experience, incomparable to the short rule of “Change Continues.” Dominating Bulgarian politics from 2008 to 2021, GERB has outlasted its time in hot water many times before. For example, Boyko Borisov, former-prime minister and the face of GERB leadership, has been accused of fraud, extortion, and connections to the mafia and oligarchy. Being on a US list of sanctioned Bulgarian oligarchs, some of these labels come naturally. Even though Borisov is one of the most controversial Bulgarian politicians to date, he still reported the single highest approval rating among Bulgarian leaders in 2023, and played a major role in merging GERB with the SDS party. Overall, GERB seems to be the perfect “middle-man” option for Bulgarians: on Balkan foreign policy and domestic policy, they can be written off as nationalistic while on other issues (particularly Ukraine and changing the Bulgarian Lev for the Euro,) GERB is seen as progressive.
This isn’t to say that more extreme parties have completely lost the Bulgarian public. The “Revival” party, led by Dr. Kostadin Kostadinov, is usually described as extremist and hyper-nationalistic. “Revival” preaches detachment from alliances like NATO and the EU, economic independence from the West, and the growth of the country’s conservative movement. Although it would seem impossible for such a party to stay afloat, hoards of Bulgarians have expressed support for Kostadinov’s plan for national revival. The party’s anti-Ukraine stance has also resonated with the public and as one of the only running parties to firmly stand against aiding Ukraine, Revival’s foreign policy strategy is entirely unique, setting them apart from the rest.
Another notable party is “The Movement for Rights and Freedoms” (DPS) party and its overall stable performance at elections. Having been present in all parliaments since 1990, DPS represents the Turkish minority of Bulgaria, although its leadership mainly has consisted of Bulgarians. More importantly, DPS functions as a significantly progressive faction, taking stances almost identical to those of “Changes Continues.” Despite holding views so similar to GERB and “Change Continues,” DPS are, in contrast, less controversial. The main disadvantage they have to grapple with is popularity in Bulgaria’s northern regions which tend to have less Turkish migrants.
Of course, those mentioned by now are far from the only parties running. The controversial “There is Such a People Party” sells itself as bringing new ideas and new faces to the table, when in reality, it’s better known for being heavily populist. Numerous smaller conservative parties have also emerged, although they’ve failed to gain significant traction. Only the pro-Russia “Greatness” party has managed to push itself into the limelight of Bulgarian politics.
Debriefing the results
Following the voting period in April, official results were finally published on June 9th, 2024. Securing the greatest percentage of votes, GERB came in first at 24.7% with DPS trailing in at a close 17.1%. Coming in at third and fourth, respectively, were PP-DB (with 14.3%) and Revival (with 13.8%.) Only three other parties passed the 4% vote threshold needed to secure a place in the parliament: the Bulgarian Socialist Party, There Exists Such a People, and Greatness. Without any particular party snagging a majority of the public vote, a one-party parliament will not be possible and instead, an agreement will have to be reached between the parties on how they will rule for the next five years. In other words, this ragtag group of misfits will have to form a functioning coalition government with GERB at the helm of such efforts.
There are, still, major barriers to unity within the new parliament. Since early July, DPS have been struggling with serious internal divisions, leading to rumors that the party will soon split up into two separate factions. If such an event were to occur, DPS would have to divide its representatives among these factions in a timely manner, i.e. without stalling activity in the parliament. Predictably, it would also make cooperation in the parliament close to impossible.
At any cost, the new parliament must avoid the incohesiveness that tore apart their predecessors. With the presence of parties that are fundamentally against each other, i.e. tensions between GERB and PP-DB or between progressive and conservative representatives, this won’t be easy. This leaves two options for Bulgaria’s future: either a highly inefficient government or the sixth election cycle in the past two years.
Policies to be expected
Assuming the parliament is like-minded enough to get laws passed, the upcoming year will be full of surprises for Bulgaria. With parties like GERB, PP-DB, and There Exists Such a People onboard and accounting for a significant portion of representatives, existing plans to officially switch out the lev for the euro could be greatly sped up. As Bulgaria currently falls short of many of the requirements needed to accept the euro, the new parliament may also be willing to arrange a way to meet said requirements by some time in 2025 or 2026. Any serious opposition to these plans would come from Revival and Greatness, which otherwise make up a smaller percentage of the government.
Inevitably, the topic of Ukrainian aid will also be brought into the halls of Bulgaria’s parliament building. Under the prior coalition, aid was passed almost unanimously, but as public opinion shifted, so did the confidence of the parliament. Those who used to be staunch supporters of Ukraine in the past may now be more unsure of whether to send more support. Additionally, the share of representatives belonging to pro-Kremlin parties has risen, making Bulgarian assistance to Ukraine even more unlikely. Of course, this doesn’t mean that pro-Ukraine parties won’t be putting up a fight. It is certain, however, that any efforts to continue arming Ukraine will be significantly more difficult.
Internally, Bulgaria will continue to struggle with approving new infrastructure plans and reviving industry. With such a divided parliament, it’s highly unlikely that any major campaigns to reform healthcare or retirement services, for example, will occur. But why? Put simply, having a more passive government may be the only way for divisions to be managed. Sadly, this will have to come at the cost of Bulgarians’ top domestic concerns: an aging population, crumbling infrastructure, and countless other issues.
No one can perfectly foresee the future awaiting Bulgaria, but predictions can be made. Another year of political instability seems probable, but could be managed if trust in the government increases and democratic ideals persist. And in the case elections are held yet again, voters must turn up for the sake of their nation and its democracy.
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