Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Adopted in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was initially created to alleviate a 2008 financial crisis involving the yuan. It soon evolved into a key foreign policy approach, working to greatly expand China’s reach within the developing world. Today, the BRI continues to represent this ideal of expansionism: its primary goal has become to extend China’s trading network by financing infrastructure plans, particularly those in underdeveloped nations. Even 11 years after its creation, the BRI has been weaponized by Chinese leaders to lure struggling countries into debt traps, force long-term reliance with Chinese manufacturers, and establish trade relationships that purposefully exclude Western nations. The main way through which this has happened has been the sponsoring of energy infrastructure deals; energy projects have been and are still being used to monopolize energy markets, fund war efforts, and bait more nations into interacting via the introduction of renewable energy alternatives. Together, these effects have immobilized entire nations while only expanding China’s global influence.

Examples of Energy Investment

Increasingly, the BRI budget has been invested in long-term energy sources abroad, ranging from options like coal to electricity. The Green Finance and Development Center predicted that for 2024, partnerships focusing on renewable energy alone would be prioritized given current investment trends. Additionally, an unexpected $7 billion was dedicated to electricity transmission projects, which essentially distribute energy from power plants to homes, accounting for up to more than 16% of the 2023 BRI budget. As part of that funding, China sponsored the construction of multiple solar power facilities in Qatar, a $4.7 billion gas pipeline deal with Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, and the expansion of 5G internet services in parts of Northern Africa. Strategically, this has allowed China to begin financing rapidly growing sectors like green energy and 5G internet, while simultaneously gaining an advantage over the US, which has failed to invest as heavily in those sectors abroad.

China’s 5G Monopoly

In 2015, the Digital Silk Road (DSR) was added to the BRI programs. The DSR finances the provision of advanced technologies, communication centers, training programs, and connection services (such as 5G internet) across the globe, with Chinese tech giant Huawei acting as the powerhouse for many of these projects. The DSR has also been used as a tool through which China can dominate energy markets abroad without needing to pressure countries into a continued relationship. 

Many nations have agreed to Huawei building extensive 5G networks designed to expand internet access within their borders. However, once said networks have been erected, these countries are more likely to choose Huawei to upgrade or replace those same networks when the time comes, effectively locking Western nations out of their internet markets while ensuring Chinese monopolization. A clear example of this strategy is Huawei’s internet dominance in Africa. Currently, 70% of 4G networks in all of Africa rely on Huawei to operate and with a new era of internet, China is poised to monopolize the 5G sector to an even more extreme extent. Countries will look to Huawei to upgrade those same 4G networks to 5G while also opening up to expanding networks as prices drop. Soon, well over 70% of Africa may be depending on Chinese companies to function.

A major factor is the ability of Huawei components being used to censor or manipulate online data. In Burundi, Huawei was involved in the blocking of various local outlets that were known for their open criticism of China. In this regard, authoritarian governments across the continent have been inclined to implement Huawei-reliant infrastructure as a way to censor critics and retain political support. As Huawei rolls out new 5G technologies with costs that stand out compared to Western competitors, this allure is likely to remain, allowing China to fully take the reins over Africa’s internet markets and retain control over their online information

Energy to Fund War Efforts

The BRI has also been weaponized to fund war campaigns, such as the junta (military regime) forces in the Burmese/Myanmar civil war. This May, China revived plans to fund a $3.6 billion dam after the initial project was postponed a decade ago due to public outcry. This marks a new milestone in Myanmar’s relationship with the BRI. After a coup that took place in 2021, large swaths of Myanmar’s energy grid became immobilized and many of the China-backed infrastructure projects were put on hold. While Chinese officials insist that they’ve poured all of their assistance into the peace process, the BRI’s patterns of investment continue to pick sides in a brutal war. The recently picked up dam project will generate close to 6,000 megawatts for the junta, arming them with an unexpected advantage over the rebel forces. Furthermore, similar proposals such as an offer to fund 26 solar power projects for the junta have been made by China, indicating that these are not standalone deals, but rather, parts belonging to an underlying strategy.

Such initiatives have also been tried elsewhere. After civil unrest and a 2023 coup in Niger, a military junta took control of the government as well as various projects directly linked to the BRI. Among these was a 1200 mile oil pipeline built by a China-based company and a $400 million dollar loan to be repaid in oil shipments. With Niger’s economy still rattled by Western economic sanctions and the political instability sparked by last year’s coup, China’s financial support has served as a lifeline for the struggling junta. This has formed a dependent relationship between the two, with Chinese companies almost wholly sustaining energy markets. Two thirds of Niger’s oilfields belong to a China-based company and that same firm has invested an upward of $4.6 billion into the petroleum industry there. 

The stability currently being enjoyed by the Nigerian economy has by proxy, become a winning point for the reigning junta. A dependable economy allows the junta to expect a steady stream of revenue and therefore, greater fiscal flexibility. China’s involvement has sustained Niger’s most promising sectors and counteracted the fluctuations in the economy that were initially imperiling junta rule after the coup, thus insulating them from Western influence. Hence, the ongoing civil war between the junta and residing rebel groups may now lean in the junta’s favor with the BRI’s supply of energy infrastructure playing an essential role.

The “Greenification” of BRI

By the turn of the 20th century, renewable energy resources and sustainable appliances skyrocketed in popularity, leading to a green revolution across developed and developing nations alike. However, these trends also gave way to a new lucrative market for green energy. As a result, the BRI has hardly changed in its purpose, but its methodology has greatly shifted course to keep up with the broader shifts in energy sources worldwide. One of the first developments behind the program’s sustainable rebranding was for a larger share of BRI-funded enterprises to be involved in metals and mining. In particular, many of the popularized mining companies work with materials like lithium and copper that have been crucial in the transition to green energy. Many BRI-funded enterprises are also turning to mass production of electric car batteries, solar panels, and similar products related to renewable energy.

Chinese officials have also made sure to weaponize the green transition, apart from merely investing in these new products. As developing and developed countries are increasingly searching for long-term energy solutions that also align with existing or potential climate commitments they make, China is vying to monopolize the green energy field in the long run. In the short term, however, renewable energy is being used as a hook to reel struggling countries into lasting diplomatic and economic relationships with China, broadening their global influence and increasing their worldwide power. 

While the junta of Myanmar has already been the beneficiary of various energy investments going straight to the battlefield, some of its gifts have gone towards building a more sustainable energy grid instead. Not only is this an attractive deal for a nation grappling with basic energy needs, but it’s also an affordable one. During a meeting in November of 2023, Chinese diplomats signed 3 wind power projects, 3 solar power plants, and a promise to assist in the case of future power outages in response to the unstable power grid the junta was being burdened by. In that same year, investment from Chinese enterprises (likely egged on by the CCP) reached 23.5% of Myanmar’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) deposits with the majority of these funds strategically being placed into the energy sector. The move to make China’s investments sustainable potentiates their existing dominance over Myanmar and reaffirms the dependent relationship the junta has with them. 

The use of green energy to strengthen or introduce diplomatic relations with China is especially efficient in developing countries; the weaker the power grid, the better. Hence, as various Central and South American countries have become more prone to instability in the past few years, they have also gained the attention of China’s BRI. Already, statistics from 2000 to 2011 pointed to a $424 billion increase in trade with the 2011 figure standing at a shocking $445 billion. Yet even with China’s countless trade relationships in Latin America, the economic engagement approach in each is getting a green makeover, in line with the broader global shift towards renewables. In 2016, China released a vision for a more sustainable Latin America with BRI investments beginning to lean towards green development and energy. In 2020 and 2021, investments also started to favor mining and metals companies involved with lithium, copper, and other strategic minerals. The result of these trends has Chinese enterprises acquiring or assuming control of many local firms. For example, the Ganfeng Lithium and Zijin Mining Group conducted 2 FDI acquisitions in Argentina’s lithium industry while in the same year, Chinese auto manufacturer Chery and a Chinese lithium carbonate factory declared 2 more. Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela have met similar fates.

However, it’s not just Chinese companies getting involved through FDI that has Latin American leaders worried. The BRI itself is setting new energy investment goals that may be strategically beneficial to China, but nothing different than bait on the reel for Latin America. Most recently, investments have taken a turn towards speeding up the decarbonization movement and encouraging efforts for renewable energy resources to replace nonrenewables. Be it technologies like electric vehicles or solar panels, their investment into developing countries is being used as a gateway to further diplomatic relations and entrench their influence. Now, Chile depends on China for nearly 40% of all of its exports, meaning in the case of economic instability, China’s cooperation would be monumental to the country’s standing. Unfortunately, this acts as a powerful tool for China to extort, giving it a dominant position over countless nations while any normal trade relationship would hinge on bilateralism and mutual help.

Global Influence and Energy

With each new partnership the BRI secures for China, the nation’s grip over the world tightens, especially considering the dominant role it often assumes over its partner states. Fortunately for China and lamentably for the West, the BRI’s expanding focus on energy is only furthering this trend. As energy infrastructure is arguably one of the most important types for any nation, a country that essentially supplies it for another is put in an all too powerful spot. If diplomatic relations between the two sour, the nation receiving investments risks everything: power outages could become widespread and uniformly damaging, public approval of the government could plummet, the technology and manufacturing sectors, among others, would likely crumble, and instability would eat away at the economy. In contrast, the nation supplying investments can merely redirect funding to a different recipient, emerging unscathed from tensions. Exactly this is the role China has taken on in the modern age and the BRI has become its weapon of choice.

Right now, China has near hegemony over many rising markets and its global manufacturing business remains formidable. 60% of global EV sales are owed to Chinese production while more than 80% of solar panel production does as well, showing that markets for eco-friendly products are especially targeted. Furthermore, China’s even planning for a renewed “space race” with the US, flexing its ability to power a second space station as early as 2035. It’s clear that energy infrastructure can be found anywhere, but an even more apparent truth has come to light: China is right behind it.

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